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The paper investigates the recent trends in privatization by local gov-
ernment organizations in Germany. It comes to the conclusion that the
privatization policy has been two-directional: on the one hand, munici-
palities have reduced their economic activities, mainly by different forms
of "contracting out"; on the other hand, they have expanded them into
profitable fields. In many cases they have preferred a "phantom privati-
zation": government bodies have only been transferred into a private-law
establishment. The paper examines the barriers to privatization and
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I Introduction: Structural Reforms and Economic Performance
1
Whilst the 1960s and 1970s manifested themselves as the decades of
nationalization, the 1980s and 1990s became the decades of privatiza-
tion. Frustrated with the poor efficiency in the public sector and with ris-
ing budget deficits, conservative governments in western democracies
started to redefine the role of the state and to roll back its frontier in the
economy. Meanwhile, the tide of privatization has reached even the re-
motest corner of the world.
The world-wide move towards privatization comes from the realization
that the economic performance of organizations relates to the manner in
which they are organized: i.e., whether they are a public sector organi-
zation or a private sector enterprise. Although the task of public and pri-
vate sector organizations is similar — both provide goods and services
to meet everyday needs — they are differently organized and are operat-
ing under different conditions. As a general rule, public sector organiza-
tions
• are hierarchically and rigidly structured and headed by democrati-
cally elected officials whereas private sector organizations prefer
flexible and tractable organizational arrangements and are run by
managers appointed by the owners of capital;
• work under fixed standards set by legislative bodies whereas private
sector organizations work on the basis of flexible contracts;
An earlier version of this paper was presented on a workshop held from 23-
25 September 1998 in Jungeup. The workshop was organized by Center for Local
Autonomy, Hanyang University, and the Friedrich Naumann Foundation. I am
grateful to the participants for their helpful comments and to Wolfgang Winkler for
linguistic improvements.• operate within narrow geographic boundaries whereas private sec-
tor organizations are free to adjust their scale of operations;
• are sheltered from competition whereas private organizations must
meet the test of the marketplace;
• are funded from tax revenues and cannot go bankrupt whereas pri-
vate organizations have to make profits — otherwise they cannot
survive.
Accordingly, public and private sector organizations have a different in-
centive system: incentives in private sector organizations consist of the
"carrot" in form of profits for good performance, and the "stick" in form of
losses for bad performance. Public sector organizations have neither the
"carrot" nor the "stick" [Bennett and Johnson 1981].
From this we have to draw an important conclusion. In the absence of an
effective incentive system, efforts to link public sector organizations to
efficiency-related goals must fail. Like a chameleon, they can change
their colour (e.g., by altering the legal status), but they still remain the
same — namely bureaucracies. This point is important: in search for
better performance, government organizations in Germany have increas-
ingly re-organized themselves by changing their legal form, in particular
by adopting the status of private-law enterprises. However, this formal
privatization cannot be the solution to the problem. The only cure is an
effective privatization by ownership transfer.
It has often been argued that production in public and in private sector
organizations should not be confused since both have to meet different
needs: the former ones are supposed to supply so-called public goods
which can be consumed only on a collective base by definition. However,this argument is wrong in almost all cases. There are only a few public
goods which must be publicly produced. As Musgrave [1959] stated, "the
inapplicability of the exclusion principle refers to the demand, not to the
supply of goods and services needed to supply public wants" [43]. There
is no convincing argument why government organizations should run
powerstations, railways, postal services, banks and housing companies
which can usually be run at lower costs by private sector organizations.
The following paper examines the recent trends in privatization in Ger-
many. Its focus is directed on local government organizations which in-
corporate an enormous potential for privatization. Germany, in contrast
to France or Italy, has a tradition of extreme decentralization.
2 This is re-
flected in its bottom-up profile of government organizations, which has
made the States (Landei) and the municipalities rather than the central
government the largest public employer. Local government organizations
in Germany provide most public utilities (water-, gas- and electricity-
supply, garbage and sewage collection, local public transport, cultural
facilities) and are heavily engaged in health service, education and
housing. Thus, they are favourite candidates for privatization.
II Extent and Forms of Public Sector Production
Germany's much-admired "Soziale Marktwirtschaft" is less market-ori-
ented than is usually thought. It reflects to a great extent the idea {Leit-
bild) of an active state, which was laid down in the philosophical work of
German thinkers such as Johann Gottlieb Fichte, Friedrich Hegel and
Until the Wilhelmine Reich was founded in 1871, Germany had been a nation, but
not a state.Karl Marx. In Prussia, which was the architect in the process of unifying
Germany in the 19th century, the government, not the private sector
spurred industrialization. At the beginning of World War I, 95 percent of
the total railway network was in public ownership whereas in Britain,
nationalization of railways started just after World War II. All in all, in
Germany governments have played a far more active role in the econ-
omy than governments in many other states with a liberal, market-ori-
ented tradition [Stolper 1940; Schmidt and Rose 1985].
Although government organizations in Germany contribute a consider-
able share to overall production, it is difficult to trace its size and struc-
ture. Public sector production takes a variety of organizational forms,
which can havethe legal status of
• government agencies,
• public-law undertakings without own legal personality (Regiebetrie-
be),
• public-law enterprises legally and financially independent of a gov-
ernment agency (offentliche Unternehmen mit eigener Rechtsper-
sonlichkeit),
• private-law undertakings with the legal status of a joint stock com-
pany or of a limited liability company fully or partially in the hands of
a government agency (privatrechtliche Unternehmen mit eigener
Rechtspersonlichkeit).
The principal distinction among these legal categories concerns ac-
countancy, financing, executive management and audit, and the legal
status of employees. The crucial problem is that the official statisticalcategorization excludes those establishments which take the form of a
private-law company.
According to the definition used by the official statistics, public employ-
ment in Germany accounted for 6.5 mill, persons in 1997, roughly one
fifth of overall employment in Germany (Table 1). Two thirds of them
were in government agencies, one third in other public bodies and en-
terprises with their own commercial accounting. Whereas the function of
government agencies is to provide mainly collective (or public) goods
(administration, tax collection, defence etc.), the function of others is to
provide goods which are either given away to the public or are sold in the
market — and which could be produced without difficulties by private
sector firms. In an earlier study, Schmidt and Rose [1985] estimated that
in 1980 about one quarter of total public sector employment was in pri-
vate sector organizations. Since then, the share has remarkably in-
creased — not because government organizations have reduced em-
ployment but because they have increasingly reorganized the production
of goods by turning dependent bodies into independent enterprises un-
der private law.













































Source: Federal Statistical Office.Table 2 - Provision of Goods by Independent Public Funds, Bodies, and





















































































































Source: Federal Statistical Office.
As a response to the increasing efforts undertaken by government or-
ganizations to separate economic from administrative functions, the
Federal Statistical Office has started to collect information about eco-
nomic activities of public funds, establishments and enterprises operat-
ing outside government agencies. Figures published recently cover the
years 1993 and 1994. Accordingly, gross production accounted for
366 bill. DM and employment for 1.8 mill, persons — roughly 6 p.c. of
overall gross production and employment in 1994 (Table 2). High shares
in economic activity were registered in electricity, gas and water supply,
public transport and others which include banks, hospitals and post and7
telephone services.
3 These figures indicate that privatization in govern-
ment organizations has frequently been implemented in a formal way by
altering the legal and organizational form and not necessarily by owner-
ship transfer: from 1993 to 1994 the number of public establishments in-
creased by 11 percent, and the value of gross production by 1 percent.
Although published figures do not allow to separate economic activities
by types of administrative bodies, it is well known that local bodies, in
particular municipalities, are heavily involved in the following fields of ac-
tivity: local public transport, electricity, gas and water supply, savings
banks, sports and recreation centres, theatres and orchestras, parks and
cemeteries, covered car parks and tourist information offices.
According to a representative investigation by Steinheuer [1991] dated
from the early 1990s, three out of four municipalities ran e.g. swimming
pools, data processing or sewage collection under their own responsibil-
ity. Only a negligible minority completely relied on private firms (Table 3).
In other fields, such as garbage collection, slaughterhouses or land sur-
vey, where private sector firms were commissioned, they frequently es-
tablished joint ventures. Usually, municipalities want to combine private
capital and management skills with public control. All in all, activities with
a dominating share of private sector firms are still rare.
After the split of the Deutsche Post (German Postal Services) into three public-law
enterprises, the Telekom was partially privatized in 1997.8




























































































































Consequently, there is still an enormous potential for privatization in lo-
cal government organizations. German municipalities produce to a large
extent goods and services which are principally "marketable". The po-
tential presently contains some profitable activities like energy supply
and banking, but also many unprofitable ones like public transport, thea-
tres or swimming-pools. Given the permanent financial constraints, it ishard to understand-why the municipalities have not yet paid more atten-
tion to low-cost alternatives.
Ill Strategies of Shifting Production from Public to Private Sector
Suppliers
Initially, Germany was a leader in privatization. However, after a promis-
ing start in the 1960s, privatization efforts fizzled out. Now, Germany has
become even a lagger in this field. In a retrospective, we can distinguish
three periods:
• In the 1960s, the Federal Government started to sell parts of large
industrial enterprises in state-ownership like the Volkswagen AG
and the Preussag AG. The sale of shares to the public (at favour-
able prices) aimed at propagating the idea of "people's capitalism"
(Volkskapitalismus). Note: around the same time, the UK and
France started a wave of nationalization in strategic sectors like
coal-mining, iron and steel, and railways.
• In the 1970s, under the pressure of rising budget deficits, new pri-
vatization initiatives were taken up. However, results were meagre.
The Federal and the State governments completely failed to push
actions ahead. Only some cities started with contracting out such
activities as cleaning, guarding or garbage collecting. At this time,
Germany failed to follow the broad privatization movement under-
taken in the UK and in other industrialized countries.
• In the 1980s, when the ideas of a "lean government" became
popular for political leaders, the debate flourished again. However,
privatization efforts were not successful until the early 1990s. With
the economy burdened by the enormous costs of German unifica-10
tion and state budgets moving deeper into the red, the Federal
Government sold almost all of its shares in industrial enterprises. It
splitted off the postal services and privatized the Telekom. In addi-
tion, it started to privatize the state-owned flight airline carrier Luft-
hansa. Ready for privatization are now the Postbank and some
large specialized banks. Still on the agenda remains the privatiza-
tion of other postal services (Deutsche Post) and of the railways
(Deutsche Bahri) which were transformed into a joint stock company
in 1994, but with the shares still being held by the government.
In contrast to the Federal Government's privatization efforts, state gov-
ernments have remained very passive. They are owners, e.g., of large
and influential state banks (Landesbanken) and of some insurance com-
panies. They hold, in addition, an important stake in electricity supply
companies. The hesitation of state governments to go ahead with priva-
tization can easily be explained: they consider these establishments their
long arm in the pursuit of industrial policy goals.
Privatization policies of local government organizations have been two-
directional. On the one hand, municipalities have reduced their economic
activities, mainly by forms which can be labelled by the umbrella term of
"contracting out". On the other hand, they have expanded them into
profitable fields such as energy supply or telephone services. Interest-
ingly, deregulation in monopolistic markets has also opened new busi-
ness opportunities for local government organizations — which they
grasped with both hands.11
In principle, local government organizations in Germany have the follow-
ing possibilities of producing services. They can
• operate their own facilities, either in form of a government body
(Regiebetriebe) or in form of an independent company in public
ownership (Eigenbetriebe),
• participate in a joint venture with private partners, either as majority
or minority shareholders,
• employ private companies by contracting out production either un-
der strict regulation or in the companies' own responsibility.
Figure 1 -Organizational Forms of Production of Services with Respect
to Public Control and Economic Efficiency
Public
control Government body










Finally, they can entrust the production and provision of services com-
pletely to the market (Figure 1).12
These forms have some advantages and disadvantages with respect to
public control and economic efficiency. Therefore, government organiza-
tions face a trade-off: in-house production guarantees a maximum of in-
fluence. However, it is often economically inefficient. Out-house produc-
tion, in contrast, is cheaper but is difficult to control. This is why local
government organizations increasingly opt for intermediate forms which
are called Public-Private-Partnership (PPP).
An example for the popularity of PPP is sewage collection. In Germany,
there exist now about 200 projects where public and private organiza-
tions form a joint venture. Three organizational forms can be found
(Table 4):
• The investor model (Betreibermodelf): planning, constructing,
financing and operating of facilities are completely in the hands of a
private sector firm. This firm concludes a long-term contract (usually
for 25 years) with a local government agency which includes ar-
rangements such as area of responsibility, user fees, supervision
and legal liabilities. Usually, the private firm does not get the control
over the sewer-system which remains in public responsibility.
• The co-operation model (Kooperationsmodell): the facilities are
planned and installed by a local government organization, but op-
erated by a private sector firm which usually holds a minority share
in the joint venture.
• The operator model (Betriebsfuhrungsmodell): a private sector firm
operates the facilities completely or partially. The government or-
ganization remains the installations
1 owner. It is responsible, among






















PPP, however, do not necessarily imply a shift from public to private
sector production. Frequently, the "private" partner of a municipality is an
enterprise completely or partially in public ownership. One of the largest
German PPP-contractors, the Vereinigte Elektrizitatswerke Dortmund,
e.g., which is engaged in 60 PPP-projects in public utilities such as
electricity and water supply, refuse and sewage collection or telecom-
munications, is a public sector company: 55 percent of the shares are
held by several large municipalities. As a result, there is a tight network
of completely publicly controlled relationships in the guise of PPP.
From all that, there are some important lessons to be learnt:
• First, local government reform in Germany has proved to be an ex-
tremely difficult task. Effective privatization has proceeded slowly
rather than speedily. Some progress has been achieved in public
utilities such as refuse and sewage collection, office cleaning and
hospital laundry, catering, estate management and urban planning.
No progress has been made in other fields such as public transport,
energy supply, health care and banking where local government or-
ganizations still hold majority stakes. The privatization of prisons,
which has been nearly completed in the US, is still unthinkable in
Germany.14
• Second, local government reform has often only led to a phantom
privatization: government bodies have been transformed into pri-
vate-law establishments whereas the economic environment in
which they operate has remained unchanged. In particular, reform
has not weakened the monopolistic position of public sector organi-
zations, sometimes it has even strengthened it. An example is pub-
lic local and regional transport where competition is still restricted by
a licence system. Recently, many public transport companies have
merged — as it is argued, to optimize supply and to gain from syn-
ergies, but in fact to keep down potential outsider competition.
• Third, local government reform has also led to an extension of pub-
lic economic activities in profitable niches. Some municipalities have
founded new enterprises which provide services exclusively for the
market — usually in competition with private sector enterprises.
Presently, telecommunication appears to be the most promising
field for large cities since many of them operate their own net. About
80 municipalities intend to go into this business, a handful (like Net
Cologne) are already active.
The question arises: what makes privatization in governmental organiza-
tions so difficult? The numerous objective obstacles fall in two catego-
ries: ideological and economic ones.
• As a rule, trade unions put up a strong resistance to all forms of pri-
vatization. Usually, the target of privatization, better performance at
lower costs, can only be achieved by reducing staff, lowering wages
and increasing flexibility in working times. All that undermines the15
comfortable working conditions of public sector employees.
4 Conse-
quently, it is relatively easy for unions to mobilize employees and
organize protest campaigns. Frequently, such campaigns find gen-
eral support because they are concerned with ordinary people as
the ultimate consumer of public services. The standard argument of
unions is that privatization would deteriorate the quality of service,
raise the costs of provision, and give profit-interested businessmen
the control over services. By that, they can often convince the public
opinion of the dangers of privatization.
A further obstacle to privatization is the high degree of nepotism in
local government organizations. Executive boards are often filled
with "well-deserved" politicians who were elected or appointed with
support of trade unions. As a result, bureaucracies can be charac-
terized by paternalistic relationships between leaders and staff.
Moreover, there are some built-in economic disincentives to privati-
zation.
Activities of public-law organizations (including public-law enter-
prises) are principally tax-free. In particular, these organizations
do not pay corporate taxes or value-added taxes. In this re-
spect, they gain a fiscal advantage over private-law enterprises.
As a consequence, government organizations have an incen-
In Germany, the conditions of work in the public sector differ from those in the pri-
vate sector. In a sense, nearly all public sector employees can be considered to
obtain a secure post which is unknown in the private sector. This guarantee was
initially meant to prevent political patronage. Now, it has become a bulwark
against more efficiency and flexibility. In addition, the gains from public employ-
ment rest on relatively high wages — although in recent years, the increase in
wages in the private sector has outrun the public sector.16
tive to run in-house production rather than out-house produc-
tion which is, in terms of total costs, much cheaper. If they opt
for a private-legal form, they tend to combine profitable and un-
profitable production as the best way to avoid taxation. In large
municipalities, e.g., public transport and energy supply are of-
ten combined in a private-law company in order to compensate
losses in some activities with profits in other ones.
- The process of privatization can lead to a taxation when assets
are undervalued in the balance sheets. In this case, a govern-
ment organization has to pay income or corporate tax for profits
attained. This can make privatization unattractive for govern-
ment organizations.
In summary, privatization is far from being appealing to German local
government organizations. It is often only considered as a means to
cope with financial constraints, not as a lever for fundamental organiza-
tional reform. Accordingly, it has not been a success story. To be fair, in
recent years, many municipalities have tried much harder than before to
bring themselves up to date. They have, in particular, introduced eco-
nomic accounting, private sector management and competitive tendering
methods. But free-marketers who had hoped the 1990s would bring a
fundamental shift of emphasis to the private sector cannot be satisfied.
IV Economic Gains from Privatization
The most important question is: how does privatization affect the costs
of providing public services? There are good reasons to suspect that pri-
vate sector firms operate more efficiently than public sector ones. Two
decades ago, Borcherding [1977] felt himself encouraged to formulate17
the "Bureaucratic Rule Two": he argued that a removal of activities from
the private to the public sector would double the costs. Borcherding has
found plenty of allies, but also plenty of opponents. Meanwhile, there are
numerous books and articles dealing with the costs of public and private
sector production.
5 Unfortunately, a large part of "empirical evidence"
comes from interest groups and must be classified as highly partisan.
Fans of privatization tend to reflect achieved cost reductions whereas
critics emphasize factual or apparent quality reductions.
The discussion among serious researchers has been highly controver-
sial, too. The crucial point is: it is difficult to disentangle the effects of
privatization from other factors which may influence the results. Pom-
merehne [1976], e.g., who compared the costs of public and private gar-
bage collection in Switzerland, isolated topography as a factor which
might affect the costs: in the mountains, where public sector provision
dominates, costs are much higher than in the lowland plains because of
frequent snowfall. On the other hand, it can be argued that most studies
are biased in favour of public sector provisions because they seldom in-
clude all costs that should be properly charged to the various services
[Bennett and Johnson 1981].
A fair evaluation of available empirical studies about the impact of priva-
tization in German local government organizations might result in the
following conclusions:
• There seems to be clear evidence that private sector production has
been found consistently more efficient than public sector production
For references to earlier literature see: Borcherding [1977], Bennett [1980], Fraser
[1988], Bishop and Kay [1989].18
[Gebhard 1989]. This applies not only to costs and prices but also to
quality. Some studies come to the conclusion that there do not ap-
pear to be any differences between public and private production
[Finsinger 1981]. But — and this is important — none of the studies
reports that public production is far less costly than private one.
The advantages of private production vary considerably from area to
area. In some areas large-scale cost cuts, in others only incre-
mental savings are reported. Savings up to 50 percent, however,
are no exception [Oelert 1976; Hamer 1981].
Large-scale cost cuts can be achieved in areas open for competi-
tion, not in those sheltered from competition. This suggests that not
ownership transfer per se but contestable markets are the best so-
lution.
6 There is some evidence that deregulation and liberalization
have considerable positive effects not only upon public sector out-
house but also in-house production. Needless to say that resistance
to competition is high in governmental organizations. Therefore,
ownership transfer can be considered as a vehicle to promote de-
regulation and liberalization.
This is what most international researchers believe: "Our principal conclusion is
that public ownership is not inherently less efficient than private ownership — that
the often noted inefficiency of government enterprises stems from the isolation
from effective competition rather than from their public ownership per se." [Caves
and Christensen 1980].19
V Concluding Remarks: How to Achieve Progress through Local
Government Reforms
The conclusions appear to be irresistible: seeing that all the evidence
proves that people can have provision of services at lower costs and
prices as well as at higher quality, local government organizations must
be encouraged to go ahead with privatization.
But what can be done to reach this goal? The theory of bureaucracy
suggests that a government organization is a budget maximizer [Niska-
nen 1971]. It hopes to gain by extending not by reducing activities. Only
a change of the incentive system can alter its utility function.
The paper, therefore, advocates a double strategy that is based on the
concept of "stick" and "carrot". The "stick" is a framework which makes it
difficult for government organizations to operate in fields of business.
The "carrot" is a reward available to the winners and a compensation
available to the losers of privatization which allow the passage of neces-
sary measures.
• The best "stick" would be to prohibit all government organizations to
do business as it has been suggested by many economists. This
could principally be done by altering the Constitution. Presently,
economic activities by government organizations in Germany are
allowed if they are justified "by public interest".
7 However, given the
fact that bureaucrats are not only opinion leaders but also hold the
The German legal system contains a variety of special regulations which appar-
ently impede economic activities. In reality, these regulations, which mainly intend
to protect government organizations from bankruptcy, are of minor importance.
They cannot be considered a vehicle for privatization [VSImicke 1995].20
^majority of seats in legislative bodies, a change of the Constitution
is wishful thinking. It would need an approval by a qualified majority
of two thirds of the votes in both chambers of the Parliament. A
more promising alternative could be to put national governments
under pressure to go ahead with liberalizing regulated markets. In
particular in the field of competition policy, the EU commission and
the EU Supreme Court have considerable power to make markets
more open and, hence, more competitive. The Commission can
compel government organizations, e.g., to make public invitations to
tender or to refrain from cross-subsidization. It can also prevent
governments from discriminating private sector producers against
public sector ones with respect to taxation.
The complement to the "stick" of competition could be the "carrot" of
financial reward for employees in government organizations and
their heads. A first step could be the introduction of a new perform-
ance-oriented wage and salary system. It should also include com-
pensation payable to those employees who lose their jobs through
privatization. This appears to be necessary to overcome the resis-
tance of unions. Privatization can be distinguished from other
classes of economic reform by the fact that its costs will be borne
extensively by a small number of people and its benefits will be
spread out over a large number. Public choice theory suggests that
in such situations, collective action will be easier to organize against
the reform than in favour of it [Bates 1988].
8
The main obstacle to the privatization of the German telecommunications sector
was overstaffing. It was, therefore, blocked by trade unions for many years. The
unions changed their minds when the government offered attractive settlements
for redundant workers.21
There are, of course, many small steps to privatization as suggested in
the literature [Frankfurter Institut 1991, 1993]. For instance, government
organizations could generally establish commercial accounting methods.
In particular, they could clearly divide administrative from economic ac-
tivities by a separate budgeting.
9 The control function of the audit offices
could be strengthened and extended. Presently, these institutions look
like a "knight without a sword". Finally, government organizations could
introduce modern organizational and management methods as applied
in the private sector economy.
The conclusions that flow from the paper might not appear to be terribly
exciting. However, there is an important lesson that can be learnt from
experiences gathered in Germany: local government reform is a slow
rather than an express train. Radical reform proposals might be liable to
decrease its speed rather than increase it.
This is obligatory for German non-profit organizations with commercial activities.22
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